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Abstract. This paper obtains the Stackelberg solution to a class of 
two-player stochastic differential games described by linear state 
dynamics and quadratic objective functionals. The information struc- 
ture of the problem is such that the players make independent oisy 
measurements of the initial state and are p rmitted to utilize only this 
information in constructing their controls. Furthermore, by the very 
nature of the Stackelberg solution concept, one of the players is assumed 
to know, in advance, the strategy of the other player (the leader). For 
this class of problems, we first establish existence and uniqueness of 
the Stackelberg solution and then relate the derivation of the leader's 
Stacketberg solution o the optimal solution of a nonstandard stochastic 
control problem. This stochastic control problem is solved in a more 
general context, and its solution is utilized in constructing the Stackel- 
berg strategy of the leader. For the special case Gaussian statistics, it is 
shown that this optimal strategy is affine in observation of the leader. 
The paper also discusses numerical aspects of the Stackelberg solution 
under general statistics and develops algorithms which converge to the 
unique Stackelberg solution. 
Key Words. Stochastic differential games, Stackelberg solution, 
linear-quadratic games, nonzero-sum games. 
1. Introduction 
The Stackelberg solution concept, originally introduced by H. Von 
Stackelberg in the contexf of static economic equilibrium (Ref. 1), has 
entered the control iterature through the works of Chen, Cruz, and Simaan 
1 This work was performed while the second author was on sabbatical leave at the Department 
of Applied Mathematics, Twente University of Technology, Enschede, Holland. 
2 Senior Lecturer, Department of Applied Mathematics, Twente University of Technology, 
Enschede, Holland. 
3 Senior Research Scientist, Applied Mathematics Division, Marmara Scientific and Industrial 
Research Institute, Gebze, Kocaeli, Turkey. Presently, Associate Professor, Coordinated 
Science Laboratory, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois. 
443 
0022-3239/81/1100-0443503.00/0 Q 1981 Plenum Publishing Corporation 
444 JOTA: VOL. 35, NO, 3, NOVEMBER 1981 
(Refs. 2--4), and has found applications inhierarchical control and differen- 
tial game problems (Refs. 5-7). Our interest in this paper lies in solving a 
class of stochastic nonzero-sum differential games with (nonnested) static 
information under the Stackelberg solution concept. 
The first result in the literature on a stochastic Stackelberg problem 
can be found in Ref. 8, where the authors obtain the feedback Stackelberg 
solution of a two-player linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) nonzero-sum 
discrete-time dynamic game problem under a nested information pattern. 
With regard to nonnested information patterns, Refs. 5 and 9 solve a class 
of static stochastic Stackelberg game problems when the underlying statis- 
tics of the random variables are not necessarily Gaussian. Some of these 
results are then utilized in Ref. 10 to obtain the feedback Stackelberg 
solution of the LQG problem of Ref. 8 under a one-step-delay information 
sharing pattern. 
In this paper, we consider the two-player continuous-time LQ nonzero- 
sum differential game under general statistics and under a (nonnested) 
static information for both players. We establish existence and uniqueness 
of the Stackelberg solution, and determine it as the solution of an integral 
equation. 
The special case of Gaussian statistics i also treated in the paper, and 
it is shown that the Stackelberg strategies are then affine in the available 
static information. Finally, the paper includes adiscussion on the computa- 
tional aspects of the solution. 
In Section 2, we formulate our problem and prove existence and 
uniqueness of Stackelberg strategies. Furthermore, we outline the underly- 
ing idea of our method of solution. This leads to a nonstandard stochastic 
control problem where the state quation contains an extra term involving 
conditional expectation of the control term, and where some of the com- 
ponents of the state vector have their initial conditions while others have 
their terminal conditions specified. In Section 3, we solve ageneral stochas- 
tic control problem of this type; and, in Section 4, we use these results to 
obtain the Stackelberg strategies. The special case of Gaussian statistics is 
treated in Section 5, while numerical aspects are discussed in Section 6. 
The paper ends with a conclusions section. 
2. Problem Formulation and Existence Consideration 
Let {xt, t >1 to} denote an n-dimensional stochastic process atisfying 
the It6 stochastic differential equation 
dx, = [A (t)xt + B 1(0u ~ + B 2(t) u a ] dt + F(t)  dW~, 
(1) 
t >t to, Xto = Xo,  
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and whose sample paths are continuous. Here, Xo is a random vector with 
known statistics, such that Elxol <o0, and {IV,, t >-to} is an n-dimensional 
standard Brownian motion. A( .  ), BI(  • ), B2( • ), F ( .  ) are appropriate 
dimensional matrices with continuous entries on [to, ti]. {u ~, t i> to} and {u~, 
t/> to} are, respectively, rl-dimensional and r2-dimensional stochastic pro- 
cesses denoting the controls of decision makers DM1 and DM2, respec- 
tively. 
The decision makers make independent noisy measurements of the 
initial state x0, which we denote by y~, i = 1, 2. We assume that the condi- 
tional joint distribution of (y 1, Y 2), given x0, is a priori known. The informa- 
tion available to each DM, therefore, is static in nature. Let H i, i = 1, 2, 
denote the class of second-order stochastic processes defined on [to, tr] 
which are yi-measurable. 
The decision law (or strategy) yi of DMi is a real Borel-measurable 
mapping 
[to, tf] x ~m'--, ~ ~', 
where ml denotes the dimension of yi, i = 1, 2. Denoting the space of all 
Borel-measurable functions 
f :  [to, tr] x R m, ~ ~,, 
with the further restriction that 
E yl)i[2 dt<oo, 
by F i, we require each permissible `/i to be in F i. Clearly, yi( . ,  yi) is in H i. 
It should be noted that, for each pair of elements in H 1 x H 2, the stochastic 
differential equation (1) admits a unique solution whose sample paths are 
continuous (Ref. 11). 
For each {@~F t,`/2~F2}, we now define the quadratic objective 
functionals of DM1 and DM2, respectively, as 
{ (' jl(,/~, ,/2)= + E x~eOxtxt , (x~O1(t)xt+u~'u~ 
o 
2' 2 U i i [ +utR( t )u , )d t  t ,= 7 (t, y ), i = l, 2 , (2) 
J 
,1  I 2(Y , Y2)=E x;O2tx,e+ (x:Oz(t)x,+u2'u 2) dtt 
o 
i yi " ] u t= ( t ,y~) , i= l ,2  , (3) 
with prime denoting transpose of a matrix, where 
Olf~O, O2t- ~> 0, Ol( , )~>0, O2(.)~>0, R( . )  I.>-- 0, 
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where the last three matrix-valued functions have continuous entries on 
[to, tt] and the expectation operation is taken over the underlying statistics. 
We note at this point that, because of the hierarchical nature of the 
solution concept o be introduced below, which allows DM2 to have access 
to the strategy of DM1, Eqs. (2) and (3) define the most general quadratic 
convex functionals for the decision makers when the cross terms involving 
the two strategies do not explicitly appear. 
To introduce the hierarchical (Stackelberg) solution concept, let us 
first note that, for each ~ ~ F ~, there exists a unique ,~2 E F 2 that minimizes 
jg(q~, y2) over F 2. This, then, implies the existence of a unique map 
T: F ~ + F 2 such that 
j~(v~, T~2)~J:(~/, ~,:), 
for all y2~ F2 and for every y l~ F 1. Now, consider the minimization of the 
functional j~(yl, Tyl) over F t, and let yX°~F I denote one minimizing 
solution; that is, 
Jl(]/1°, r'~l°) ~ Jl( 'y 1, r~I ) ,  VTIE1 "1. (4) 
2 ° Then, we say that the pair (,/lo, Y = T@ °) provides a Stackelberg solution 
for the game problem under consideration, with DM1 as the leader. Our 
objective in this paper is to study the existence, uniqueness, and (most 
importantly) characterization of the Stackelberg solution of the nonzero- 
sum linear-quadratic stochastic differential game formulated above. 
The existence and uniqueness questions may be answered most readily 
by converting the problem into an equivalent hierarchical static game 
problem in Hilbert space. Barring the stochastic aspect, our approach is 
identical to that in Ref. 3. We introduce" an inner product (.,-)~ on H i 
through the relation 
(u, v)~= E{ f£rut(to)' vt(w) dt} (5a) 
for each pair {u a H/, v ~ H~}, to ~ fl, with (It, ~,  ~)  denoting the underlying 
probability space. With these inner products, H i, i = 1, 2, become Hilbert 
spaces. Let L2r([t0, tf] × f~) denote the completion of the space of continuous 
functions from [to, t t] × f~ into R ", under the inner product 
(x,z)t=E{xtf(to)'ztr(to)+I£ r dr}. x,(~o )' z,(to ) (5b) 
Further, let ~i, i = 1, 2, be the operators mapping Lzr([to, tr] × l)) into itself, 
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defined by 
~Oi(t)x,(w), to <- t < tr, 
(~,x),(oJ) = [ Oi~xq(ea ), t = ft. 
Define Volterra operators 
~'i : H i "+ L i f ( [ to ,  tr] x It), i = 1, 2, 
by 
¢1 
(~ibl)t(O)) = [ ~(t ,  s)Bi(s)us(oJ) ds, 
at o 
where qb(t, s) is the state transition matrix function satisfying 
dcb(t, s) /dt  = A(t)cb(t, s), qb(s, s) = I. 
Further, let 
r E L2f([to, tf] x It) 
be defined by 
(6) 
(7a) 
(7b) 
R:H2->H z 
is defined by 
(Ru)t(~o)=R(t)ut(oJ), to<-t<-ti. (11) 
3: i For fixed 3'1~ F 1, minimization of 2(3' , 3 '2) is equivalent o the control 
where 
t 
r,(o)) = ~b(t, o)xo(w)+ dP(t, s)F(s) dW,(o2). (7c) 
o 
The solution of (1) can then be expressed as 
x=r+~ 1(., 1 2 y )+~q23" (', y2). (8) 
Then, the quadratic objective functionals of DM1 and DM2 respectively 
become 
1 ,+~ 2, Jl(3"l, 3"2)=(~1(~9?1"y1(', y ) 23 / t ' , y2)+r) ,~P lT l ( ' , y  1)
+5~23 2(., yZ)+r)r+(3i( .  ' yl), 3"1(., yl)) i 
+(y2(. ,  y2), Ry2(. ,  y2))2, (9) 
j 1 
2(Y , y2) = (~2(~a3"1(., yl) +~23 2(., y2) + r), ~1y1( • , yl) 
+~23"2(., y2) +r)e+(r2( .  ' y2), 32(., y2))2, (10) 
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problem of minimizing 
Ja(u 2) = (~2(~'flT~( ' , yt)+~CP2u2+r),~t~lT1(', yl)+~2u2+r)f+(u2, U2)2, 
(12) 
for u 2 ~ H 2. Now, [ + ~'2"~.2.~P2 being strongly positive and having a bounded 
inverse (~gP* denotes the adjoint of ~2 in H2), Y2(u 2) has the unique 
minimum 
2 u = - ( I  + ~,~2~2) -1~- ,~2(~171( . ,  Y 1) q_ r). (13) 
Substituting this expression for 3,2(., y2) in (9) and rearranging terms, we 
get, in terms of the notation discussed above, 
Jl(71, T@) = (71( • , y 1), (f -}- ~ )71( . , y 1)) a -~ 2(71( . , y 1), ~*~ 1~ 
+ £e*~ 2£e2(I + ~*~2~2)-1R (I + ~*~2~2)-a~*~2r)1 + Jlo, 
04) 
where Jlo is independent of 71, 
= ~1~ lC~1 q- ~ 2~9~2 (I + .g~*~ 2~LP2)- 1R (I + 5f*~ 2~,2)- 1~ 2~1, 
and ~*  is the adjoint of ~1 under the inner product (5b). Again, I+~ 
being strongly positive and having a bounded inverse, taking variations in 
F 1, we can readily show that there exists a unique ),1o for which J1(71, 7"/a) 
has a minimum. Then, this guarantees existence of a unique Stackelberg 
solution for the nonzero-sum stochastic differential game above. 
Let us now outline our method of solution. For each 71 ~ FI, the control 
u2e H 2 that minimizes Y2(u 2) is given by (see Ref. 12 for details): 
2~+k21 2 -B2(t)'{S2(t)E[xtlY J , t ,  b/t = 
where 
Sz(t) = -A  (t)'S2(t)- S2(t)A(t) - O2(t) + S2(t)B2(t)B2(t)'S2(t), 
S2(tf) = O2f, (15) 
I~ 2 = - (a ( t ) ' -  S2(t)B2(t)B2(t)')k 2 - S2(t)B l(t)E[@(t, y 1) ] y2], 
k~,=O; (16a) 
and let us denote E[xt l y 23 by ~2. Then, 
dd~ = (A(t ) -  B2(t)B2(t)'S2(t)).f 2, d t -  B2(t)B2(t) ' k 2 dt 
+Bl(t)E[y~(t, y~)ty 2] dt, (16b) 
JOTA: VOL, 35, NO. 3, NOVEMBER 1981 449 
Furthermore, if 
then 
~2 X,o = Z[X,o I y 2] = E[xo l y2]. 
-*2 et---Xt--Xt, 
(16c) 
de, = A(t)et dt + Bl(t)yl(t ,  yt) dt 
-B l ( t )E[y l ( t ,  yl)ty2 ] dt + F(t) dWt, (16d) 
% = Xo -E [xot  y2]. (16e) 
^2 2 In terms of these newly introduced variables x t, e,, k,, we can express 
J1 as follows: 
T, y1)=xql.21fxq.,2'.-. A2 + , f~ te ^2' he J l ( ] /1 ,  etrOll% + _o(xt Ol(t)x, + e~Qi(t)et 
+ {2~'$2(t) + k2t'}B2(t)R (t)B2(t)'{S2(t);~ + k2t} 
+ 3,1(t, yl),3 l(t ' yl)) dr. (17) 
Therefore, the leader is faced with a nonstandard stochastic optimization 
problem, the general formulation and solution of which is discussed in the 
next section. 
3. Digression: Nonstandard Stochastic Control Problem 
Let us consider a stochastic system whose state evolves according to 
the following stochastic differential equation: 
dxt = {axt +By(t, y) + CE[y(t, y) I z]} dt + dwt, (18) 
where xt is an n-dimensional stochastic process; y and z are p-dimensional 
and q-dimensional random vectors, respectively; y: [to, t r]× R p-; ~ ,  and 
all admissible y belong to F, with F being a linear vector space; wt is 
n-dimensional Brownian motion, and A, B, C are appropriate dimensional 
matrices. We are interested in the situation where some components of xt 
are specified at the initial time to and the rest are specified at the terminal 
time t r. Let us instead consider a slightly more general set up. Thus, there 
exist matrices To and T r such that 
Toxto = m Tfxt~ = X (19a) 
are given. To ensure that all the components of x~ are specified at one of 
the endpoints, we impose the restriction that 
T'oTo + T'~T r = L (19b) 
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Furthermore, in order to avoid some cumbersome xpressions in the 
analysis to follow, we assume that the system matrix is structured so that 
TrAT'o = 0, (19c) 
which is a condition that is fulfilled for the Stackelberg problem under 
consideration (see Section 4). Finally, we assume that F is chosen such 
that, for each I/e F, there exists a unique solution of (18) satisfying the 
boundary conditions (19a). 
Our problem then is to determine 3'e F for which 
{ f/' t} J(T) =E x~rQrxtr+ [x~O(t)xt+T(t ,y) '3 ' ( t ,y)]d (20) 
o 
attains a minimum, where 
Or >! O, O(t) >I O, for a.e. t e [to, tr]. 
We use standard variational argument to solve this problem. If we 
perturb 1/to T + e/3, suppose that the state xt is perturbed to xt. Then, 
dx~ = {Axt  +BT(t,  y) + EBfl(t, y) + CE[3,(t, y)lz] 
+ ~CE[# (t, y)lz ]} dt + dwt, 
" T f  " Tox to = ,rr, x t~ = X" 
We can clearly decompose x~ as xt + Ent, where 
fit = Ant  + Bfl (t, y) + CE[fl (t, y) [z], 
Tonto = O, Trot , = O. 
Taking first variation in J, a necessary condition for minimum is that 
6tJ(y;  fl) = E n'trOfxtf + [7'tO(t)x, + fl(t, y)'T(t, y)] d = 0, 
o 
¥/3 eF. 
Since the second variation is positive, the above condition is also sufficient. 
Define n ~ and n ~ by 
r~ =An~ +BB(t, y), 
• 2 2 
nt =Ant  +Cfl(t, y), 
Then, 
Tont'o = 0, rm , = 0, (21a) 
2 To~Tt2o =0, Trot , =0. (21b) 
nt ='rb 
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and the necessary and sufficient condition for minimum may be reexpressed 
as 
cStJ(y ;/3) = E{ 77 ~OrE[xtr[y] + EErt~/lz]O~E[xtrlz] 
q 
+ f [rl~'Q(t)E[xtly]+ E[~?~' tz]O(t)E[xtlz] 
d to 
+ fl(t, y)'y(t, y)] dr} = E{ rt:iO,E[xt, ly]+ rl~'OtE[E[xt, lz]ly] 
+ ~'O(t)E[x, 2' lY]+ r/t O(t)E[E[xtlz]ly] 
+fl(t, y)'y(t, y)] dt} = 0, Vfl e F. (22) 
Let 
Then, 
and 
Y~t'=E[xtly] and ~c~'=E[E[xtlz]ly]. 
Ay Ay xt =Ax,  +By(t, y)+CE[E[y(t, y)lz]ty], (23a) 
Zo;tYo = E[~r  ]y] ,  *Y Tfi,, = E[X I y], (23b) 
.qy ~y x t = Ax,  + (B + C)E[E[y(t, y)[z]] y], (23c) 
~'y 
Tox ,o = U[E[~rlz]ly], T;,~r, = E[e[xlz]ly], (23d) 
1' ^y ~t 61J(Y; f l )=E rlteQy~tf+ 2' ~y q Tlt~ Of; te ÷ 1" ~y o En, O(t)x~ 
2' .~y } + n~ O(0x, + fi(t, y)'y(t, y)] dt =0, V/~ ~ F. 
Note now that, under (19c), T~ and T~t 2 satisfy, respectively, 
T~ , 1 = T IATrT~ + TrBfl(t, y), T~t~f = 0,, 
T,C ' = TIATeT~t + TtC~(t, y), Tm~ = 0, 
so that 
where 
ft q 
T~ = - dgr(t, o')TrB(o')fl(cr, y) do', 
I( f Tt'rt~ = - ~( t ,  o')TtC(o')/3(o', y) do', 
(24) 
(25a) 
(25b) 
(d/ dt)cbf(t, cr) = TrAT'rdgr(t, o'), ebb(o-, o') = L (25c) 
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Since 
T'o To + T'rTr = I, 
(21a) and (21b) may be written as 
• i t t 1 ~lt =A(ToTo+ T~Tf)rlt +Bfl(t, y), 
• 2 t t 2 rh =A(ToTo+ TrTf)rh +CB(t, y); 
and, multiplying further by To, we have 
ro~ ,' 1 = ToAToTo~Tt + ToAr'rTt'q~ + ToB3(t, y), 
= ToAToTo~?t + ToATrTtqlt + ToCfl(t, y), 
which imply that 
ft t t 1 Torl~ = Oo(t, o')[ToBfl(cr, y) + ToA(o')TfTm~ ] do-, o 
f t  t ! 2 To~, 2 = qbo(t, o')[ToC/3 (o', y) + ToA(o')TfTm~] do', 
o 
where 
( d/ dt )dPo( t, o" ) = ToAToCbo(t, or), 
Therefore, 
Oo(o', o') = L 
To]-/t lo = O,  
To r/,2o =0, 
(26a) 
(26b) 
(26c) 
1 t 1 1 t rl, = roront + TrTm, 
f t ~t, = T; ~o(t, o-)r0B(o-)3(o-, y) do-- r;~ O~(t, o')rrB(o')~(o-, y) do- 
o 
- T~o ~o(t, r)ToA(z)r)  q~f(% o')rfB(o')fl(o', y) do'dr. 
o 
Now, 
f t~r(t, o')rrB(o')B(o', y) do" = qbr(t , tr) q~r(tr, o')rrB(o')3(o', y) do" t o 
- ftl dPf(tf, o')TrB(o')fi(o', y) do'] = ~ifdPf(t, o')TfB(o-)fl(o', y) do" 
t 
- I t  qb~(t, o')TrB(o-)fl(o" , y) do'. 
o 
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Furthermore, 
-T ;  Oo(t, r)ToA(r)T'~ Of(r, o')TjB(o-)fl(o-, y) do-dr 
o 
= -r~o dr Oo(t, r)roA(r)T'~OA.r, o-)T~B(o-)~(o-, y) do- 
o 
t t 
+ T'o ~ do" f,, dr C~o(t, r)ToA(r)r 'rcbf(r  , o-)TrB(o-)fl(o- , y) do- 
o 
= - dr T'o dPo(t, r)ToA(,c)T'rOf(r, cr)TfB(o-)fl(o', y) do" 
o 
t t 
+ dr To Oo(t, ' ~')ToA (r) T f Of(r, o-)TrB(o-)~ (o-,.y) do-. 
Then, 
where 
tit = Pl(t, o-)B(o-)/3(o-, y) do"- o')B(o')/3(o-, y) do', 
o 
Pl(t, o-) = T'o Oo(t, o-)To+ T}Or(t, o-)Tf 
t *  t 
J~ IT; ~o(t, r)ToA(~)T'r~(~, o-)Tr] d~', + 
I/ PZ(t,o-) r fo f ( t ,o - )T f+ ' ' o.)Tr]dr. = ' [ To Oo(t, r) Toa ('c) T f  Of(r, o 
Analogously, 
~Tt = P~(t, o-)C(o-)/3(o-, y) do ' -  o-)C(o-)fl(cr, y) do'. 
o 
Let us now define 
P(t, o-) = Pl(t, o-)-  PZ(t, o-) = T'o Oo(t, o-) To 
- dr T'o~o(t, ~')roA(r)T'~Of(% o-)Ti, 
o 
(27a) 
(27b) 
(27c) 
454 JOTA: VOL. 35, NO. 3, NOVEMBER 1981 
and note that 
o ~7, O(t )x ,  dt = do-fl'(o', y)B'(o-) el(t, o ' ) 'O( t )~ dt 
o 
te 
- f t?do-f l ' (o- ,y)B'(o-)~op2(t ,o-) 'O(t)~Ytdt 
tr do-fl'(o-, y)B'(o-) P(t, o-)'O(t)£r dt 2 , ^y  = - P (t,o-) Q(t)xt  d . 
o o 
(28a) 
Analogously, 
rl, O(t)xt  dt = dtrl3'(o', y)C'(o') P(t, o')'O(t)x,~r dt 
to 0 
1 2 Utilizing (28a)-(28b) in (24), together with the expressions for ~ tf and ~7 tr, 
we finally obtain 
8aJ(y; f l)= E{ ft; fl(t, y)'/(t, y) dt} =0, Vfl~F, (29a) 
where 
l(t, y)= 3,(t, y )+ B(t)'P(tr, t~'~ ~r, ,, +C(t) 'e(tr ,  t)'Qfi,e ~y
+B(t) '  P(cr, t) 'O(~)2Y~do-+C(t) ' P(o-, t)'O(tr)x~" do" 
Ij -B ( t ) '  2 , ~, P (o-, t) Q(t)x~ do- - C(t)' p2(o-, t)'Q(o-)x~Y do-. 
o o 
(29b) 
It now readily follows from (29a) that a necessary and sufficient condition 
for y ~ F to provide a minimizing solution is that 
l(t, y)=0, Vt~[t0, tr], a.e. ~y. 
The following lemma summarizes the result. 
Lemma 3.1. A control strategy e F provides a minimizing solution 
to the stochastic optimum control problem formulated in this section iff it 
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satisfies the integral equation 
y(t, y)=-B(t)'P(tr,  t)'Of£~- C(t)'P(tr, t vr~ 8y J ~fJ. t r 
-B(t)' fttrP(tr, t)'O(cr)£~dtr-C(t)' ftttP(cr, t)'O(tr)~cY~dcr 
t t 
o o 
(30) 
where Ay ~r xt and xt satisfy (23a)-(23b), P(t, ~r) and P2(t, tr) are given by 
(27a)-(27c), and qb0(t, o-) and ~r(t, tr) satisfy (26c) and (25c), respectively. 
4. Determination of Stackelberg Strategies 
We now go back to our original problem as discussed in Section 2. 
We have to minimize the cost functional given by Eq. (17), subject o the 
constraints (16a) through (16c). To this end, we first define the new state 
vector 
and the matrices 
-A(t)-B2(t)B2(t)'S2(t) 
_A(t)= 0 
0 
_B(t)= B t) , _C(t)= 
Q:r=diag(Q:~ Q:~ 0), 
0 -B2(t)B2(t)' 
A(t) 0 
0 -(A(t)'-SZ(t)B2(t)BZ(t) '] 
-B~(t) I" i f(t)= F(t) , 
L o j 
-Ql(t)+S2(t)B2(t)R(t)B2(t)'S2(t) 0 
0 Q:(t) 
B2(t)R(t)B2(t)'S2(t) 0 
] ~ 
B2(t)R(t)B2(t)' ] 
Then, we have the following minimization problem for player 1: Minimize 
: , :q 
J l(y:, T7 ) =_x,,Q:~_x¢ + [_x;Q:(t)_xt + 7:(t, y:)'y:(t, y:)] dt, 
o 
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subject o 
dx.t = {_A(t)_xt + B_ (t)yl(t, y 1) + _C(t)E[ l(t, yl) [ y2]} dt + if(t) dWt, 
where ~2 2 tO, e~o, kq are given. 
This stochastic optimum control problem can readily be solved by 
applying the result of Lemma 3.1. To this end, xt, A, B, C, F of Section 3 
must be identified with _xt, A, _B, C, _F. Furthermore, 
0 00], Tr= [0, 0, /], To=[ log  
where I stands for suitable-order identity matrix and 
2 
~= , X q - -0 .  
L etod 
Note that, for these specific structural forms, 
T'oTo+T'ITr=I and TIAT'o=O; 
therefore, conditions (19b) and (19c) are satisfied. Then, 
__B2B2S 2 
ToA T'o = [ A o o], 
and ~o(t, o') can be split into four submatrices which satisfy 
[q~(t,o-) (I)~2(t,o')] [A-B2oBZS2 0][(I)~l(t,o -) (I)12(t,O')] 
(d/dt) qb021(t, o-) CI)22(t, o') = aJ[qb21(t, o') ~22(t, o') ' 
o-) o-1 
q)~l(cr, °') (i)2z((r,o.)]=[£ 01]. 
Therefore, 
dl)12(t, o') ---- qb21(t, O') ----- 0, 
( d/ dt )~ lol ( t, o') = (a - B2 B2'S2)C~ ioi ( t, tr ), 
(d/dt)c~2(t, or) = A~2o2(t, o'), 
On the other hand, 
TfA T'f = - (A '  - S2B 2B z), 
(31a) 
qb0n(o', cr) = I, (31b) 
qb02Z(tr, r)=L (31c) 
(d/dt)~r(t , (r) = -(A'-SZB2B2')dPf(t, o'), dPi(cr , (r) = L 
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T~oTo = 0 qb , 
0 0 
To d~o(t, z) ToA(z)rfd~r('4 cr)Tr = 
and define 
Thus, 
~r(t, o-) = dPo11(o-, t)'. 
11 Let us denote qbo (t, o-) by gift, o-) and cI)oZ2(t, ~r) by ~(t, o-). Now, 
[i°:l T ' ffb r T r = 0 , 0 ~r 
0 -~( t ,  r)B2(r)B2(z)'~(cr, z)'] 
0 0 j , 
0 0 
Then, 
F(t, o') = dr ~(t, ~')Be(~')B2(z)'qffo-, r)'. 
o 
(32) 
• (t, tr) 0 F(!o-) i 
P(t, ~) = 0 O(t, o-) 
0 0 
p2(t, or) = 0 
o ,v(o-, t) J 
Let 
~21 E[k2 ly , ] ,  ~'2~ ^2 At =E[etiyl]. = Xt =E[xt  ]yl], e, 
Then, the following result follows directly from Lemma 3.1 by identifying 
y with yl, z with y2, and y with yl. 
Theorem 4.1. The two-person nonzero-sum stochastic differential 
game with static information, as formulated in Section 2, admits a unique 
Stackelberg solution with DM1 as the leader. The leader's corresponding 
Stackelberg strategy l e F 1 is given by 
lO tw .--~ A1 y (t, y l)=-BI(t) ' [(~(G t ) ,_S2(t)F(G , ~21 t) )O~rxt, +d~(ff, ) te~retrj 
_B l ( t ) ,  Itg[(~(~r, t),_S2(t)F(tr,  , .¢21 t) )(Off~)x~+S2(O-)L) 
+ qb(cr, t)'Ol(o')~] do" 
t 
+ Bl(t)'S2(t) f IF(t, o')(Ql(o-)~ 21 +$2(o')2~.)-~(t, do-, 
J t  o 
(33) 
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where 
2,t = B2(t)g(t)B2(t) '[S2(t)fc2t: + fczt: ], 
~21 ^1 "21 and x~ , e t, k t satisfy the differential equations 
~21 = (a  -B2B2'S2):~ 21+BaE[E[y:°(t, yl)ty21 h ~2~2'#21 Xt  y ] -~  15 xt , 
(34a) 
(34b) 
l l  ^1 et = Aet  + Bt( t )yx°(t ,  yl)_B~(t)E[E[ylo(t, y:)ly2]lyl], (34c) 
/~2tt = - (A '  - SZBZB z)kt`21 _ S2B1E[E[T:o( t ,  yl)ly2]ly:], (34d) 
~21 x to = E[E[xo  ] yE][y 1], (age) 
,:o = E[xo I Y 1]_ E [E [xo  I Y 2] 1Y a l, (34f) 
/~2: q = 0. (34g) 
Furthermore, the corresponding unique optimal response strategy of DM2, 
the follower, is given by 
2 ° 3' (t, y2) = -B2( t ) '{S2( t )x  2 + k t2}, (35) 
where the relevant terms are defined by (15) and (16), with y: replaced 
1 o by y 
5. Special Case of Gaussian Statistics 
When the statistics of the random variables involved are jointly 
Gaussian, some of the expressions that determine the unique Stackelberg 
strategy of the leader can further be simplified; in particular, it can be 
shown that the Stackelberg strategy is affine in the available static observa- 
tion. Toward this end, let us first assume that x0, y :, y2 are jointly Gaussian 
with mean values ~0, 91, ~ ,  respectively. 
Furthermore, let us introduce the appropriate dimensional matrices 
AOl, A02, A :2 ,  A21 through the relations 
E[xol yi] = f °+ Aoi(yi- ~), i=1 ,2 ,  (36a) 
E[y~ ]yJ] = ~i + ai i (y i -  fi), i , j= 1,2, i# j .  (36b) 
Now, starting with expressions (14), we note that y:o [which satisfies (33)] 
is also given by 
1 o y (., y : )=- (z+~) - l{~l~+~e~*~2(s+~*~)  -: 
x R (I + ~*~2~2)-:La*~2r}, (37) 
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where the relevant erms are defined following (14). It has already been 
shown in Ref. 12, Appendix 1, in a different context, that ~*  is a linear 
operator which, when applied on an element of L2r([t0, t r] × ~) under the 
Gaussianness assumption, yields an element of H i which is affine in y ~. A 
similar analysis readily proves that ~*  also possesses the same property. 
Then, rt(w) being a Gaussian vector for each t ~ [to, tr], we arrive at the 
conclusion that, under the Gaussianness assumption, ylo(., yl), as given 
by (37), is affine in yl. In particular, also in view of (33), it can be written 
as  
1 o 
y (t, yl) = _B l ( t ) , [K ( t ) (y l _  ~1) + I(t)], (38) 
where K( .  ) is an (n × m0-dimensional matrix-valued function and l(. ) is 
an n-dimensional vector-valued function, both of them being independent 
of yl-)T1. 
Now, to determine the expressions yielding K (.) and l(. ), we substitute 
the functional form (38) into (33) and also into (34a) through (34d). Firstly, 
we obtain from (34d) 
/~1 = K k (t)A12A21(y ~ _ 371) + ik(t), (39a) 
where Kk( • ) and lk( • ) uniquely satisfy 
Kk =_(A_BZBZSZ) ,Kk  +SZBiB1,K(t )  ' Kk(tt) =0, (39b) 
[k = _ (A_BZB2,S2) , Ik+S2B1Br l ( t ) ,  /k(t~) = 0. (39c) 
Using this solution, together with (38), in (34b), we further obtain 
x, = KX(t)(y +if(t) ,  (40a) 
where KX (.) and l~ (.) uniquely satisfy 
I~2 ~ = (A - B2Bz'S2)K x - B IB  ~'K (t)AizA2i - B2B Z K k (t)AlzA21, 
KX(to) = Ao2A21, (40b) 
[~ = (A -B2B2 'S2) l  x -B iB l ' l ( t ) -BZB2 ' Ik ( t ) ,  if(to) = x0. (40c) 
Thirdly, substitution of the structural form (38) into (34c) yields 
e, = K ~(t)(y l -  ~l), (41a) 
where K"( • ) uniquely satisfies the differential equation 
I~2 ~ =AKe-B1BI 'K ( t )+B iB I 'K ( t )A lzA21,  Ke(to)=Aol-Ao2A21.  
(41b) 
If we use all these in (33), we finally obtain the following two integral 
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equations whose unique solutions yield K( .  ) and l(. ), respectively: 
K(t) = ~(t  I, t)'-sz(t)F(t~, t)'QliK~(tr) +d~(tf, t)'Q~fK~(t~) 
+ {[~(o', t) ' -S2(t)F(o ", t)'] 
x [Q1 (o')K x (or) - Sa(O.)B2RB z(SZ(o')KX (o.) 
t 
+gk(o')A12A21)]+~(o., t)'Ol(o-)ge(o')} do--  Sz(t) f {F(t, o') 
at  o 
x [Ol (o.)K x (or) + S2(O.)BZRBz(sa(o')KX (o.) + K k (O.)AlzA21)] 
- ~(t, O.)B2RB 2'[S2(o.)K x(o.) + K k (O.)A12A21]} do', (42) 
l(t) = [atY(tf, t ) ' -  S2(t)F(tr, t)']QlrlX(t) 
+ {[q*(o', t)'-S2(t)F(o., t)'] 
tg 
x [Ol(o-)/x (o.) + S2(o.)B2RBZ(S2(cr)lX (o.) + l k (o')]}do" 
- S2(t) [ i  {F(t' o')[ Ql(o')l~(o') + S2(O.)BZRB2'(S2(O.)IX(°') 
+ I k (cr))] - ~(t, O.)B2RBZ[S2(o')I ~(o.) + l k (o.)]} do.. (43) 
The following theorem now summarizes the main result of this section. 
Theorem 5.1. When all the random vectors are jointly Gaussian 
distributed, the two-person nonzero-sum stochastic differential game of 
Section 2 admits a unique Stacketberg strategy for the leader, which is 
given by (38), with K( .  ) and l(. ) solved from (42) and (43), respectively, 
also in view of the relations (39)-(41). The corresponding unique optimal 
response strategy of the follower is again given by (35). 
Proof. As discussed prior to the statement of the theorem, this result 
follows directly from Theorem 4.1 after verification of the optimal affine 
structure (38) for ylo under the Gaussianness assumption. Substitution of 
(38) into (33) and an appropriate decomposition readily yields Eqs. (42) 
and (43). 
Remark 5.1. It should be noted that, under the Gaussian statistics, 
the unique Stackelberg strategy of the leader, as presented in Theorem 
5.1, is composed of two parts: (i) a linear transformation on the zero-mean 
part of the leader's observation, which depends on the statistics of the 
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Gaussian random variables involved; and (ii) a linear transformation on 
the mean value (fo) of the initial state, which is independent of the statistics 
of the random variables. Hence, we can say that the Stackelberg solution 
also features aseparation property. In fact, the latter part of the Stackelberg 
strategy of the leader, which involves a linear transformation on f0, also 
constitutes a Stackelberg solution to the deterministic version of the non- 
zero-sum differential game of Section 2, in which the leader has open-loop 
information and f0 stands for the initial state vector. In that respect, the 
solution presented here, i.e., 
y~°(t, fo) = -B~(t)'l(t), 
is less restrictive than the one given in Ref. 3, since it does not require the 
linear transformation to be differentiable. Whenever l(. ) is differentiable, 
then the two solutions coincide. 
6. Computational Aspects of the Stackelberg Solution 
In this section, we develop an algorithm to solve numerically for the 
leader's Stackelberg strategy from Eq. (33) and under general statistics. 
To this end, let us first observe that the solutions of the differential equations 
lo  (34b) through (34d) can be obtained through affine transformations on y ; 
and, when these are substituted into(33), together with the linear relation 
(34a), the right-hand side of (33) becomes an anne  function of y~o. Hence, 
there exists a linear operator Y3: F 1 -~ F 1 and b e F ~, such that (33) can be 
written equivalently as 
lo  "r (t, y~) = (~y~°)(t ,  yl)+b(t, y~). (44) 
Explicit expressions for the operator ~ and the function b can readily be 
obtained in terms of the parameters of the problem. 
Now, by an abuse of notation, we can also think of ~3 as a mapping 
from H 1 into H 1 and of b as an element of H 1. Then, Eq. (44) can be 
written equivalently as 
u 1 =~ul+b,  (45) 
which is known to admit the unique solution 
I o 10 u =y (t, yl). 
Then, a natural algorithm to obtain u ~° is the following. 
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Algorithm 
Step 1. Start with any u l~H1;  substitute this into (34a) through 
1 ° ^ ~21 ~1 ^21 (34d) for 3/ , and solve for the corresponding unique zt, x t , e~, k t . 
Step 2. Substitute these into the right-hand side of (33) to generate 
a new u 1 ~ H 1. 
Step 3. Use the new u t obtained at Step 2 to replace the starting 
choice at Step 1, and iterate. 
Proposition 6.1. Let there exist a 0 < p < 1 such that 
(u, ~*~3u)1 <~ p(u, u)l, Vu s H 1. (46) 
Then, the preceding algorithm converges to the unique Stackelberg control 
u lo of the leader, regardless of the initial choice. 
Proof. The result readily follows, since H 1 is a Hilbert space and ~3 
is a linear contraction operator under (46). [] 
If the condition of Proposition 6.1 is not satisfied, then the proposed 
algorithm in general will not converge. However, in such a situation, it is 
still possible to develop a convergent algorithm by starting, this time, with 
Eq. (37), which we rewrite as 
t -~u 1+~ (47a) U --- 
where  
f '~*~l~+~*~2~2( I+~*~2~2) - IR ( I+~*~2~2)  '1 ~2r .  (47b) 
Now, if the operator norm of/~ is less than unity, i.e., 
II. llo< : ,  
we have the algorithm 
/A l l  = - 1 -~u j  + ~ (48) 
which is directly obtainable from (47a) and is convergent, since ~ is a 
linear contraction operator and H ~ is a Hilbert space. If the condition 
II llo < 1 
is not satisfied, then we add 0Iu I to both sides of (47a) to obtain 
(1 + O)Iu ~ = (01 - ~)u  1 + ~ (49) 
where I: H~--> H 1 is the identity operator and 0 is a scalar satisfying 
20 ~>fl~llo. 
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Then, the algorithm 
u~+~ = [1/(1 + o)](o:-~)u] + [1/(1+ o)]r (so) 
converges to the unique solution u1° c H 1, a result which follows from a 
convergence proof given in Ref. 13 for a similar algorithm, since 9~ is a 
nonnegative s lf-adjoint operator. It should be noted, however, that this 
algorithm is computationally more difficult han the first one proposed in 
this section, since it involves the inversion of an integral operator in 
determining r (though, this inversion has to be done only once, and not 
at every iteration point). 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we have obtained the Stackelberg solution of a class of 
stochastic linear-quadratic differential game problems in which both players 
have access to static information concerning the initial state of the game. 
Existence and uniqueness of the solution is established, and the leader's 
optimal strategy is shown to satisfy a particular integral equation. For the 
special case when all the random variables have jointly Gaussian statistics, 
this integral equation admits a solution which is affine in the observation 
of the leader. We have also discussed in the paper numerical aspects of 
the Stackelberg solution under general statistics, and have developed 
algorithms which converge to the unique Stackelberg control of the leader. 
As a by-product of our analysis, we have also obtained the solution of a
nonstandard stochastic ontrol problem, which is formulated and solved 
in Section 3 in more general terms than required in the solution of the 
Stackelberg problem. 
One natural extension of the results of this paper would be to obtain 
the feedback Stackelberg solution of linear-quadratic-Gaussian continuous- 
time differential games in which the players make sampled observations 
of the state and share this information with a one-step delay (as formulated 
in Ref. 12 within a team framework). In other words, a counterpart of the 
results of Ref, 10 in continuous-time can be obtained by utilizing the theory 
developed in this paper under static information. A repeated application 
of Theorem 5.1 would lead to the conclusion that the feedback Stackelberg 
strategies in such a differential game will again be affine in the information 
available to the players; derivation of these strategies, however, requires 
a rather involved analysis, details of which will be presented in a future 
paper. 
464 JOTA: VOL. 35, NO. 3, NOVEMBER 1981 
References 
1. WON STACKELBERG, H., The Theory of Market Economy, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, England, 1952. 
2. CHEN, C. I., and CRUZ, J. B., JR., Stackelberg Solution.for Two-Person Games 
with Biased Information Patterns, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 
Vol. AC-17, No. 5, 1972. 
3. SIMAAN, M., and CRUZ, J. B., JR., On the Stackelberg Strategy inNonzero-sum 
Games, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol. 11, No. 5, 1973. 
4. SIMAAN, M. and CRUZ, J. B., JR., Additional Aspect of he Stacketberg Strategy 
in Nonzero-Sum Games, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol. 
11, No. 6, 1973. 
5. BASAR, T., Information Structures and Equilibria in Dynamic Games, New 
Trends in Dynamic Systems Theory and Economics, Edited by M. Aoki and 
A. Marzollo, Academic Press, New York, New York, 1979. 
6. CRUZ, J. B., JR., Leader-Follower Strategies For Multilevel Systems, IEEE 
Transactions on Automatic Control, Vol. AC-23, No. 2, 1978. 
7. BASAR, T., and SELt3UZ, H., Closed-Loop Stackelberg Strategies with Ap- 
plictions in the Optimal Control of Multilevel Systems, IEEE Transactions on 
Automatic Control, Vol. AC-24, No. 2, 1979. 
8. CASTANON, D., and ATHANS, M., On the Stochastic Dynamic Stackelberg 
Strategies, Automatica, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1976. 
9. BASAR, T., Hierarchical Decision Making under Uncertainty, Dynamic 
Optimization and Mathematical Economics, Edited by P. T. Liu, Plenum Press, 
New York, New York, 1979. 
10. BASAR, T., Stochastic Stagewise Stackelberg Strategies For Linear Quadratic 
Systems, Stochastic Control Theory and Stochastic Differential Systems, Edited 
by M. Kohlmann and W. Vogel, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Germany, 1979. 
11. FLEMING, W. H., and NISIO, M., On the Existence of Optimal Stochastic 
Controls, Journal of Mathematics and Mechanics, Vol. 15, pp. 777-794, 1966. 
12. BAGHI, A., and BASAR, T., Team Decision Theory for Linear Continuous- Time 
Systems, Twente University of Technology, Enschede, Holland, Department 
of Applied Mathematics, Memorandum No. 274, 1979. 
13. ALLWRIGHT, n. C., Contraction Mapping Algorithm with Guaranteed Conver- 
gence, Proceedings of the 5th IFAC Congress, Paris, France, 1972. 
